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Abstract. Electronic institutions are software frameworks integrating normative 
environments where agents interact to create mutual commitments. Contracts 
are formalizations of business commitments among groups of agents, and 
comprise a set of applicable norms. An electronic institution acts as a trusted 
third-party that monitors contract compliance, by integrating in its normative 
environment the contractual norms, which are applicable to the set of 
contractual partners. In this paper we present and explore a contract model that 
facilitates contract establishment by taking advantage of an institutional 
normative background. Furthermore, the model is flexible enough to enable the 
expansion of the underlying normative framework, making it applicable to a 
wide range of contracting situations. 
1   Introduction 
Research on norms and multi-agent systems has grown the Electronic Institution (EI) 
concept as the basis for the development of appropriate normative environments. 
Such environments are created to establish some kind of social order [4] that allows 
successful interactions among heterogeneous and autonomous entities. 
As with any recent discipline, however, differences exist between the conceptual 
views of the “institutional environment”. Some authors [1] advocate in favor of a 
restrictive “rules of the game” approach, where the EI fixes what agents are permitted 
and forbidden to do and under what circumstances. In this case norms are a set of 
interaction conventions that agents are willing to conform to. Other researchers [2] 
take a different standpoint, considering the institution as an external entity that 
ascribes institutional powers and normative positions, while admitting norm 
violations by prescribing appropriate sanctions. Others still [9] focus on the creation 
of institutional reality from speech acts, regarding an agent communication language 
as a set of conventions to act on a fragment of that reality. 
A common element in each of these approaches is the norm, which enables us to 
control the environment, making it more stable and predictable. Arguably, one of the 
main distinguishing factors among researchers using norms in institutions is the level 
of control one has over agents’ autonomy. 
Our own view of electronic institutions (as initiated in [14] and developed in [13]) 
has got two main features that motivate the present paper. Firstly, the institution 
includes a set of services that are meant to assist (not only regulate) agent interaction 
and the creation of new normative relationships. This means we do not take the 
environment as static from a normative point of view (as seems to be the case in [1]). 
New commitments may be established among agents, through contract negotiation (as 
also noted by [3]); the resulting contracts comprise a set of applicable norms. 
Additionally, part of the aforementioned assistance is achieved by enriching the 
institutional environment with a supportive normative framework. This will allow 
contracts to be underspecified, relying on default norms that compose the institution’s 
normative environment where the contract will be supervised. 
In this paper we present and explore the definition of a contract model that takes 
advantage of an institutional normative framework. The model is flexible enough to 
encompass contracts of varying degrees of complexity. A contract is established with 
support of the normative background and relying on a model of institutional reality. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the 
institutional environment that supports the contract model presented in this paper. 
Section 3 addresses the contract model itself, including its motivation and detailing its 
constituent parts. The model tries to take advantage of the underlying environment 
while at the same time enabling the expansion of the normative framework. Section 4 
explains contract handling within our electronic institution framework, focusing on 
the representation of contracts in a computational way. Finally, section 5 concludes 
by highlighting the main features of our approach. 
2   Institutional Environment 
The notion of multi-agent systems assumes the existence of a common environment, 
where agent interactions take place. Recently more attention is being given to the 
environment as a first-class entity [17]. In the case of electronic institutions, they 
provide an environment whose main task is to support governed interaction by 
maintaining the normative state of the system, embracing the norms applicable to 
each of the interacting agents. 
In order to accomplish such task, in our approach [13] the EI is responsible for 
recording events that concern institutional reality. This reality is partially constructed 
by attributing institutional semantics to agent interactions. 
As mentioned before, we seek to have an EI environment with a supportive 
normative framework. For this, norms are organized in a hierarchical structure, 
allowing for norm inheritance as “default rules” [5]. 
2.1   Elements of Institutional Reality 
The institutional environment embraces a set of events composing a reality based on 
which the normative state of the system is maintained. Norm compliance is monitored 
consistently with those events, which can be grouped according to their source: 
− Agent-originated events: in our approach, norm compliance detection is based on 
the assumption that it is in the best interest of agents to publicize their abidance to 
commitments. They do so by provoking the achievement of corresponding 
institutional facts (as described in [13]), which represent an institutional 
recognition of action execution. 
− Environment events: norms prescribe obligations when certain situations arise. In 
order to monitor norm compliance, the institutional environment applies a set of 
rules that obtain certain elements of institutional reality, including the fulfillment 
and violation of obligations. While fulfillment acknowledgement is based on 
institutional facts, violations are detected by keeping track of time, using 
appropriate time ticks. Both norms and rules may use institutional facts as input. 
Rules also allow obtaining new institutional facts from old ones. 
These events are the elements of institutional reality summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Elements of institutional reality 
Element Structure 
institutional fact ifact(<IFact>, <Timestamp>) 
obligation obligation(<Agent>, <IFact>, <Deadline>) 
fulfillment fulfilled(<Agent>, <IFact>, <Timestamp>) 
violation violated(<Agent>, <IFact>, <Timestamp>) 
time time(<Timestamp>) 
 
Because of the normative framework’s organization (as explained in the next 
section), elements of institutional reality are contextualized, that is, they report to a 
certain context defined inside the institutional background. 
Our norm definition is equivalent to the notion of conditional obligation with 
deadline found in [8]. In particular, an Ifact (an atomic formula based on a predefined 
ontology) as included in an obligation comprises a state of affairs that should be 
brought about, the absence of which is the envisaged agent’s responsibility; 
intuitively, an achievement of such state of affairs before the deadline fulfills the 
obligation. The Deadline indicates a temporal reference at which an unfulfilled 
obligation will be considered as violated. Fulfilled or violated obligations will no 
longer be in effect. Monitoring rules capture these semantics, by defining causal links 
(as described in [7]) between achievements and fulfillments, and between deadlines 
and violations. 
There is a separation of concerns in norm definition and norm monitoring. The 
latter is seen as a context-independent activity. Also, the detection of norm (or, 
strictly speaking, obligation) fulfillment or violation is distinguished from repair 
measures, which may again be context-dependent (e.g. through contrary-to-duty 
obligations). This approach differs from [16], where norms include specific violation 
conditions, detection and repair measures. 
2.2   Normative Framework 
Our view of the EI concept [13] considers the institution as an environment enforcing 
a set of institutional norms, but also allowing agents to create mutual commitments by 
voluntarily adhering to a set of norms that make those commitments explicit. The EI 
will act as a trusted third-party that receives contracts to be monitored and enforced. 
Furthermore, with the intent of facilitating contract formation, we approach the 
normative framework using a hierarchical approach, enabling the adoption of contract 
law concepts such as the notion of “default rules” [5]. These enable contracts to be 
underspecified, relying instead on an established normative background. The 
grouping of predefined norms through appropriate contexts also mimics the real-
world organization of legislations applicable to specific activities. These norms will 
be imposed when the activity they regulate is adhered to by agents. 
Our approach consists of organizing norms through contexts. Each contractual 
relationship is translated into a new context specifying a set of norms while inheriting 
others from the context within which it is raised. The top-level context is the EI itself. 
A context definition includes the information presented in Table 2. The super-
context (which may often be the EI itself) indicates where the current context may 
inherit norms from, while the context type dictates what kinds of norms are applicable 
(those that govern this type of relationship). 
Table 2. Context definition information 
Component Description 
super-context the context within which this context was created 
type the type of context 
id the context identifier 
when the starting date of the underlying contract 
who the participants of the underlying contract 
 
The components described in the table are meant to provide structure to our 
normative framework. It is the normative environment’s responsibility to use this 
structured context representation in order to find applicable norms in each situation. 
The specificity of norms will require further information regarding the contract to 
which they apply. For this, we consider the explicit separate definition of contextual-
information, which will be dependent on the type of context at hand. For instance, in a 
simple purchase contract, the delivery and payment obligations will need information 
about who are the vendor and customer, what item is being sold and for what price. 
3   Contract Model 
This section will provide a description of our proposed contract model. We will start 
by providing the main assumptions that guided the approach, and proceed with the 
details of each contract piece. The figures illustrating contract sections were obtained 
using Altova® XMLSpy®. 
3.1   Guidelines 
When devising our contract model, we considered the main principles that should 
guide this definition. On one hand, as stated before we wanted a model that could take 
advantage of an established normative environment; therefore, each contract should 
be obtainable with little effort, and with as few information as possible. On the other 
hand, we also wanted to make the contract model as expansible as possible, allowing 
for the inclusion of non-predefined information and norms, while still keeping it 
processible by the EI environment. This requirement will allow us to apply the EI 
platform to different business domains. 
The contract model should therefore allow us to: 
− Include information necessary for context creation, and additionally any contract-
type-dependent information to be used by institutionally defined norms. 
− Add contract-specific details that are meant to override default institutional norms, 
e.g. by defining contract-specific norms. 
− Expand the predicted contract scenarios by enriching the environment’s rules for 
institutional fact generation. 
The next sections describe how each of these purposes is handled. 
3.2   Contract Header 
Although, in general, a contract may include rules and norms, in the extreme case a 
contract that is to be monitored by the EI may be composed only of its header. 
Everything else (including the applicable norms) may be inherited from the EI. This 
minimalist case is illustrated in Figure 1, where dotted lines indicate optional 
components that we will refer to later. The rounded rectangle with ellipses is a 
compositor indicating a sequence of components. 
 
Fig. 1. Generic contract 
The contract header (Figure 2) includes mandatory information that is needed for 
context definition, namely: the contract id, the creation date (when), and the 
participants’ identification (who). The type of contract is optional; if not defined, a 
generic context type will be assumed. The super-context is also optional; if omitted, 
the general EI context is assumed. 
Depending on the contract type, additional information may need to be provided. 
This information can be included in a frame-based way: each peace of contractual-
info (Figure 3) has a name and a set of slots (name/value pairs). 
Finally, each contract may indicate the state-of-affairs according to which the 
contract will be terminated. The structure of ending-situation is analogous to the 
situation component of a norm definition (as described in the following section). 
 Fig. 2. Contract header 
 
Fig. 3. Contract-type-dependent contractual-info 
3.3   Adding Contract-Specific Norms 
One way of escaping the default institutional normative setting is by defining norms 
that are to be applied to a particular contract instance. This is irrelevant of the contract 
having or not a type as indicated in its heading. A contract of a certain type will 
inherit institutional norms that are applicable to that type of contract as long as no 
other contract-specific norms override them. A contract with no type at all will need 
its norms to be defined in the contract instance. 
In our conceptualization, a norm prescribes obligation(s) when a certain state-of-
affairs is verified (Figure 4). A name is given for norm identification purposes. 
 
Fig. 4. Contractual norm 
The situation may be described by institutional reality elements (except 
obligations) and access contractual-info. Figure 5 includes a choice compositor for 
situation elements, which may be combined by the logical connectives and, or, and 
not. Relational conditions may be included to compare numeric values. 
 
Fig. 5. Situation assessment 
The situation elements ifact, fulfilled and violated match the corresponding 
institutional reality elements (see Figure 6 and Table 1), as does time. 
 
 
  
Fig. 6. Situation elements from institutional reality 
The prescription of norms indicates obligations (Figure 7), which have a similar 
structure to the corresponding institutional reality element. 
The usage of institutional reality elements and contractual-info inside norms is 
allowed to use variable bindings inside appropriate patterns (e.g. within facts and 
according to the employed ontology), such that they can be referred to in other norm 
components. In the future our schema definition will evolve to make this more precise 
(getting input from other XML rule languages such as RuleML or JessML). For now, 
we simply assume that variables may appear anywhere inside the mentioned elements 
and starting with a question mark (‘?’), which is Jess’s syntax [10]. 
 
Fig. 7. Obligation prescription 
When including norms in a contract-specific way, the normative environment will 
consider as applicable the most specific norms, that is, those with a narrower scope. 
This allows a contract to override predefined norms from a super-context (if 
specified). The same approach is taken when defining a contract-specific ending 
situation (in the contract header), which may also be predefined for certain context 
types. 
3.4   Expanding the Creation of Institutional Facts 
Following a “counts-as” approach (defining “constitutive rules” [15] or 
“empowerments” [12]), we attribute institutional semantics to agent illocutions. That 
is, institutional facts, which are part of institutional reality, are created from these 
illocutions. This process takes place at an institutional context. 
In order to assure the applicability of our environment to different contracting 
situations, we also included the possibility of iterating through institutional facts 
(although this is also the case in [15], we take a slightly different perspective [13]). 
That is, certain contractual situations may consider that certain institutional facts (as 
recognized by the EI) are sufficient to infer a new institutional fact. The rules that 
allow these inferences to take place are context-dependent and may be specified in a 
contract-instance basis (see Figure 8). A rule name is given for identification 
purposes. 
 
Fig. 8. Rule definition for institutional facts 
We consider the iterative generation of institutional facts as context-dependent 
because it allows contract fulfillment to be adjusted by matters of trust between 
contractual partners or due to business specificities. Thus, it may be the case that only 
in specific contractual relationships some institutional fact(s) count as another one. 
This approach also enhances the expansibility of the system, not restricting norm 
definition to the institutional fact ontology defined in the preexistent fact-generating 
rules. It may be the case that a contract defines new institutional facts through these 
rules and also incorporates norms that make use of them. 
4   Contract Handling in the Electronic Institution 
The contract model described in the previous section comprises an XML schema from 
which contracts are drafted in the contract negotiation phase. The EI provides a 
negotiation mediation service for this purpose. After this, the negotiation mediator 
hands over the contract to a notary service, who collects signatures from the involved 
agents. After this process is completed, the notary requests the EI to include the 
contract in its normative environment. The contractual norms will then be part of the 
normative state of the system, and the EI will be responsible for maintaining this state 
by monitoring the compliance of the involved agents. Figure 9 illustrates this process. 
 
Fig. 9. Contract handling 
4.1   From XML to a Computational Contract Representation 
In order to achieve a computational normative environment, a declarative language 
was chosen for norm representation and processing. Furthermore, in order to facilitate 
communication with the rest of the agents, the EI includes an agent personifying the 
institution itself and its normative environment. This agent includes an instance of a 
Jess rule-engine [10], which is responsible for maintaining the normative state of the 
system and to apply a set of procedures concerning the system’s operation. 
Hence, in order to allow its processing by the normative environment, the XML 
contract undergoes a process of transformation into appropriate Jess constructs. (see 
Figure 10). The Jess language includes a set of frame-like constructs. 
 Fig. 10. From XML to Jess 
The generated Jess code will be added to the Jess engine, and comprises 
information regarding the contract creation (which includes a Jess module definition 
and a context construct), optional contextual-info (and associated Jess template 
definitions), and applicable rules and norms (defined as Jess rules). 
A rule-based approach to norm representation and monitoring is also pursued in 
[11]. However, those authors seem to implement in a backward-chaining logic 
program the semantics of a forward-chaining production system. We follow a more 
intuitive approach by employing a forward-chaining shell. 
4.2   Norm Monitoring and Inheritance 
The module definition and the structured context representation (using super-context 
relations), are the cornerstones for enabling norm inheritance. Norms are defined 
inside the module representing the contract’s context (that is what the “x::” after 
defrule stands for, where x is the module/context name). When applying rules, the 
Jess engine looks at a focus stack containing modules where to search rules for firing. 
When no rules are ready to fire in the module at the top of the stack, that module is 
popped and the next one becomes the focus module. 
Exploiting this mechanism, we implemented rules that manage the focus stack and 
thereby enable the application of the most specific norms in the first place. The event 
that triggers these rules is the occurrence of a new institutional reality element (IRE), 
which as explained before pertains to a certain context. 
The Jess engine will therefore be guided to look for a module where there is an 
applicable rule taking the IRE as input. It will start at the IRE’s module, and go up 
one level until the top (main) module is reached or the IRE is processed. 
This initial exploitation of Jess’s features enabled us to start building a proof-of-
concept regarding our approach to norm inheritance in a hierarchical normative 
structure. Further refinements will allow us to configure the system concerning 
monitoring responsiveness and the integration of social extensions like reputation 
mechanisms. 
<contract …> 
 <header> 
  <id>x</id> 
  <when>…</when> 
  <who>…</who> 
  <super>…</super> 
  <type>…</type> 
  … 
 </header> 
 <rules>…</rules> 
 <norms>…</norms> 
</contract> 
(defmodule x) 
(context 
 (super-context …) 
 (id x) (when …) (who …) ) 
 
(… 
 (context x) …) 
(deftemplate x::… 
 …) 
(defrule x::… 
 …) 
… 
XML Contract Jess constructs 
5   Conclusions 
The EI concept has been approached from different perspectives. Considering the 
increasing importance of multi-agent system environments [17], the EI can be seen as 
an interaction-mediation infrastructure maintaining the normative state of the system. 
One of the most important principles of our approach is the assumption of a non-
static normative environment; this means that we depart from a more conservative 
view of norms seen as a set of preexistent interaction conventions that agents are 
willing to comply with (as in the adscription approach of [1]). We pursue an EI that 
provides a supportive normative framework whose main purpose is to facilitate the 
establishment of further commitments among a group of contracting agents. 
The possibility of having an underlying normative framework, from which norms 
may be inherited, is a distinguishing feature of our approach, as is the “loose 
coupling” between norms and contrary-to-duties. Also, the institution includes norm 
monitoring policies that span all created contracts. This is in contrast with other 
approaches, namely [16], where these policies and repair measures are spread among 
the norms themselves. 
The hierarchical organization of norms takes inspiration in the real-world. The 
most useful case for “default rules” [5] is in defining contrary-to-duty situations, 
which typically should be not likely to occur. For this reason, such situations are not 
dealt with in each contractual agreement, and parties usually recur to law systems that 
include default procedures [6]. 
In this paper we presented our approach towards the definition of a contract model 
that can exploit such an environment. The model was devised taking into account two 
aims: it should be easy to compose a new contract, by taking advantage of an 
institutional normative background; and it should be possible to improve on the EI’s 
environment in order to make it applicable to different business domains. 
We are confident that we have met both these goals. In our model, a minimalist 
contract may be limited to header information including the contract participants and 
contractual-info that describes the negotiated objects. On the other hand, a complex 
unnoticed contractual relationship may be defined using our contract model, by 
exploiting the whole structure including contract-specific norms and institutional fact 
generating rules. The next steps of this work include exploring the developed contract 
model through different contracting scenarios. 
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